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This review assesses differences and similarities of
the states in planning for pandemic influenza. We reviewed
the recently posted plans of 49 states for vaccination, early
epidemic surveillance and detection, and intraepidemic
plans for containment of pandemic influenza. All states
generally follow vaccination priorities set by the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices. They all also
depend on National Sentinel Physician Surveillance and
other passive surveillance systems to alert them to incipi-
ent epidemic influenza, but these systems may not detect
local epidemics until they are well established. Because of
a lack of epidemiologic data, few states explicitly discuss
implementing nonpharmaceutical community interventions:
voluntary self-isolation (17 states [35%]), school or other
institutional closing (18 [37%]), institutional or household
quarantine (15 [31%]), or contact vaccination or chemopro-
phylaxis (12 [25%]). This review indicates the need for cen-
tral planning for pandemic influenza and for epidemiologic
studies regarding containment strategies in the community.
M
uch recent attention, public, governmental, and aca-
demic, has been focused on the possibility of an
influenza pandemic, possibly arising from a mutated or
genetically reassorted strain of the currently circulating
avian influenza virus (H5N1). In the United States, state
and local health departments are primarily responsible for
detecting an outbreak and implementing the public health
response. Accordingly, individual states and the US
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have
each recently released pandemic influenza plans and guide-
lines. These plans are now available (online Appendix
Table 1, available from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol12no09/06-0369_appT1.htm). Because state health
departments are autonomous of federal control, their
approaches to surveillance and containment are likely to
vary. Thus, this review was undertaken to determine the
extent of differences between states in their approaches to
detecting and controlling pandemic influenza.
State Procedures and Plans 
Forty-nine states have Internet websites that include
statewide pandemic influenza procedures and plans or, in a
few instances, have simply addressed broad questions
about state-based responses to pandemic influenza
(Appendix Table 1). Often these plans, which are funded
by a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
preparedness cooperative agreement, were posted in the
last half of 2005 or early 2006, and these documents are
still largely in transition. US HHS has recently issued
guidelines (1); however, specific planning, problem solv-
ing, and funding are still left to the individual states.
Almost all of the states’ plans address a wide range of
issues regarding command and control, surveillance, vac-
cination, antiviral drugs, communication, and emergency
management and containment measures. The purpose of
this review was to focus on community public health
strategies, especially vaccination, surveillance and detec-
tion, and containment, which the various states develop as
they refine their plans.
General Processes
Vaccination
In general, all 49 states with posted plans are in accor-
dance with one another on vaccination priority strategies
(online Appendix Table 2, available from http://www.cdc.
gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no09/06-0369_appT2.htm). Many
state plans indicated that they were constrained by the
uncertainties of future vaccine and antiviral drug supply
and effectiveness and the properties of a future influenza
epidemic.
Nonetheless, general agreement exists, explicit or
implicit, to provide vaccination during a pandemic that is
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Generally, these guidelines were based on Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommen-
dations (2) and HHS guidelines (1) if the latter were avail-
able at the time the state plan was drafted. The clear
priorities involved the following groups: 1) healthcare
workers (some states also include emergency responders
such as emergency medical technicians, fire fighters, and
police officers; political leaders; utility workers; trans-
porters of vaccine; and vaccine manufacturers); 2) persons
with respiratory, immunodeficiency, cardiovascular or other
high-risk conditions; 3) persons >65 years of age (17 [35%]
plans also consider vaccinating children 6–23 months of
age); 4) household members, caregivers, and other close
contacts of those ill or likely to be ill; and 5) all others.
The first 3 of the these groups were variously priori-
tized by the states as high-priority vaccine recipients, but
all states consider these 3 groups as the highest priority. A
few states, such as Maine, have estimated that 15%–20%
of their populations would be in such high-priority groups
to be vaccinated.
Surveillance and Detection
Of the 49 states that have posted their plans, all rely on
the National Sentinel Physician Surveillance (NSPS), the
nationwide 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System of
pneumonia- and influenza-related deaths (3,4), or both.
Forty-seven (96%) states also explicitly indicated they
would evaluate reports of clusters or unusual influenzalike
cases by local physicians, clinics, and institutions in their
state, and 40 states (82%) indicated they would evaluate
reports of laboratory-confirmed influenza from state health
department and other laboratories (Appendix Table 2).
Although many states describe plans for enhanced sur-
veillance during pandemic influenza, relatively few (12
[25%]) currently have or envision real-time syndromic
surveillance of influenzalike illness (ILI) in persons seek-
ing care at clinics or hospital emergency departments to
detect the onset of pandemic influenza (Appendix Table 2).
To our knowledge, the cities currently using syndromic
surveillance are New York City, Washington, DC,
Pittsburgh, and some cities in North Carolina and Virginia.
In addition, the CDC BioSense program (5) plans to
expand syndromic surveillance to 300 clinical sites by the
end of 2006.
Eight states (16%), including California (especially in
Los Angeles), New York, and Hawaii, are developing ways
of screening incoming international travelers. However,
current plans for other international entry points, such as
Seattle, Portland, Chicago, and Atlanta, do not indicate any
similar (foreign) international traveler quarantine and test-
ing activities.
Containment Measures
The various state plans are markedly heterogeneous in
their personal contact-avoidance measures and prophylax-
is (Appendix Table 2). Most states outline pandemic
influenza responses that do not include general and early
encouragement of many specific personal avoidance steps,
such as staying home from work and keeping sick children
at home.
Seventeen (35%) states explicitly plan or are consider-
ing recommending (voluntary) personal social isolation on
the community level, such as staying at home or keeping
children at home if they feel sick. Eighteen (37%) other
states cite federal or state regulations that indicate that
health authorities may close schools, businesses, and other
institutions during a severe outbreak, although they are not
required to resort to such closures. However, 15 (31%)
other states also indicate legal ability to quarantine per-
sons, households, or institutions. (However, in some states
such as Michigan, the efficacy of quarantine is directly
questioned in their current document.)
Given the high cost and limited supply of neu-
raminidase inhibitor antiviral drugs and an uncertain sup-
ply and effectiveness of future vaccines, only 12 (25%)
states plan or consider using either chemoprophylaxis
(such as oseltamivir) or vaccination of household and other
close nonhospital contacts in their plans to retard epidem-
ic influenza.
Implications
The control of future pandemic or interpandemic
influenza will necessarily rely on each individual state’s
plan to vaccinate persons and detect and contain this dis-
ease. Still, the current national (HHS) pandemic influenza
plan presents only a categorization and listing of steps,
rather than explicit direction for the states. This lack of
central coordination can result in a patchwork of plans that
will not adequately detect and control this or other respira-
tory disease pandemics.
Given the lack of clear guidance, coupled with the fact
that no one knows when an influenza pandemic may strike,
what its characteristics will be, and the effectiveness and
quantity of strain-specific vaccine, the evolving state plans
are nonetheless in agreement in adhering generally to
ACIP and HHS guidelines for prioritizing vaccination
(1,2). In general, the elderly, those with chronic diseases,
and healthcare and infrastructure personnel will be priori-
tized to receive vaccination, and in approximately one
third of states, young children will be prioritized to be vac-
cinated (6). We believe the estimate that such persons
make up ≈15%–20% of the population in any state is rea-
sonable (1). However, this vaccination strategy is predicat-
ed on preventing deaths from influenza, not stopping or
retarding an epidemic or pandemic (7). Given that vaccine
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available for several more years, the goal of reducing
transmission would require much more vaccination than is
available.
Regarding surveillance and detection, state plans are
even more variable than they are about strategizing vacci-
nations. All states indicate that they plan to use the NSPS
network and the nationwide 122 Cities Mortality
Reporting System (3,4). In NSPS, each year ≈1,100 (55%)
of  ≈2,000 healthcare providers nationwide voluntarily
report the number of weekly outpatient visits for ILI and
submit specimens from a subset of patients to state public
health laboratories for influenza virus testing. The 122
city-specific mortality reporting is unavoidably even more
delayed. Neither system would likely detect a local out-
break of influenza <2 weeks into its establishment. Thus,
some state and federal authorities are assessing the utility
of syndromic surveillance of ILI (e.g., cough, headache,
and fever) in emergency departments and clinics in test
cities. Several such programs exist, and CDC’s BioSense
(5) includes plans to expand such early surveillance to 300
clinical sites. However, to our knowledge, no health
authority feels confident that earlier detection of influenza
by 1 to 3 weeks would necessarily lead to better control or
substantial retardation of an outbreak.
Finally, confusion and lack of specificity exist in these
posted state plans in proposing practical containment
measures in the community. The national HHS Pandemic
Influenza Plan (1) has several recommendations for infec-
tion control in the hospital setting but is weaker and non-
specific in other areas such as control of influenza in the
community. For example, there is no agreed-upon defini-
tion of geographic clustering of cases or number of persons
infected that will trigger the declaration of a pandemic.
Much of this national plan suggests social distancing and
respiratory (cough) etiquette and devotes much of its dis-
cussion to mask use. Accordingly, states are comparably
nonspecific about community control plans. Vaccination or
chemoprophylaxis of contacts is infrequently addressed,
mainly because the vaccine supply is limited, as are the
most effective antiviral drugs, the neuraminidase inhibitors
oseltamivir and zanamivir, for the next several years. Even
when these vaccines and drugs become available, consid-
erable obstacles remain to detecting influenza promptly
and getting vaccination or drug therapy to the contacts of
influenza patients.
Several practical nonpharmaceutical containment steps
need to be considered. For example, only approximately
one third of the state plans are explicitly considering rec-
ommending self-isolation of adults with influenzalike
symptoms and keeping children with such symptoms
home from school and daycare. Even in this increasingly
computer-based economy, in which a considerable per-
centage of persons can work from home most of the time,
this simple stratagem is not addressed in most state plans.
Other simple recommendations for use in the community,
such as avoiding mass gatherings; shopping on off hours;
and household and workplace strategies such as frequent
hand washing, avoiding handshaking, and keeping towels
separate, are often neglected in state plans.
Why are there these state plans so disparate? We
believe some of the problem results from weak central
(federal) direction, as has been a criticism of national
bioterrorism preparedness (8). Fortunately, state and feder-
al plans are still in flux, many are still in draft form
(Appendix Table 1), and getting a clearer delineation of a
basic plan that all states can follow is still possible. The US
Secretary of HHS has been meeting with states
(http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/convening.html) to
review pandemic preparedness issues.
However, we also believe that answers are lacking to
several key epidemiologic questions necessary for rational
planning. What is the typical intrahousehold or institution-
al attack rate, and would vaccination or chemoprophylaxis
of contacts retard or stem outbreaks? How well do masks
work for pandemic influenza in the community, and when
and for how long should they be used? Does closing a
school or other institution actually reduce community-
level illness and death? Does earlier detection of influenza
in a community lead to behavior changes that could stem
an outbreak? We know of no studies designed to address
these and several other issues; e.g., the Models of
Infectious Disease Agents Study (MIDAS) (9) has been
forced to rely on estimates of household attack rates esti-
mated >30 years ago (10,11) for a nonpandemic (H3N2)
strain of influenza virus. Several state plans, such as
California’s, expressed frustration about this lack of infor-
mation.
Thus, we believe that a revision of the national pan-
demic influenza plan, which despite unavoidable gaps in
our knowledge, relies on professional and public health
opinion to provide more uniform, specific, and practical
influenza protection, avoidance and containment practices
for pandemic and interpandemic influenza in the commu-
nity would be helpful. We also believe it would be prudent
to begin studies and, in the interim, create expert panels to
determine if masks, school closings, social isolation, and
several other nonpharmaceutical strategies would be use-
ful in reducing the illness and death caused by pandemic
influenza and its spread in the community.
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